Brazilian experience – The crash of 1982 by Freitas, Carlos Eduardo
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Learning from Latin America: Debt crises, debt 
rescues and when and why they work 
 
 
20 February 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2 
 
Brazilian experience – The crash of 1982 
Carlos Eduardo Freitas1 
Summary and conclusions 
1) The first signs that an external credit bubble could be developing in Brazil date 
from 1974 and 1975. Price of oil had been suddenly multiplied by four at the end of 
1973. Brazilian external debt rose by 35% from 1973 to 1974 and a further 25% in 
1975.  Current account deficit that was US$ 1,7 billion in 1973, jumped to US$ 7,1 
billion in 1974 and US$ 6,7 billion in 1975. Those developments called the attention of 
independent economic analysts and inside the Central Bank too. 
2) Several scenarios throughout the seventies had been offered by the Economic 
Department to the Central Bank Board and to the Ministry of Finance as well, warning 
of the route of collision being taken by Brazilian economic policy. They just ignored 
them. 
3) After the crash a comprehensive solution proved impossible, due to the 
insolvency of Brazil. Focus was to avoid loss of control over the situation in the short 
run and to temporize while gaining time in order to have a real solution sometime in 
the future, when general conditions were eventually more favorable. 
4) IMF stand-by arrangements were inadequate to provide support for a 
comprehensive solution, once Brazil was facing a problem of insolvency and not of 
liquidity. IMF assistance was designed to handle liquidity and transitory problems. 
Fundamental imbalances require time, patience and medium and long term 
macroeconomic policies. IMF deals with short term macroeconomic policies. 
Interesting to note that this difference of approaches was the insight behind the Baker 
Plan of 1985 (to bring the World Bank to the center of the stage together with IMF).  
5) Temporization strategy (“muddling through") coupled with inflationary finance 
did the job to gain time. However it led to domestic monetary disorder, political 
reaction and rupture measures afterwards (aggressive moratorium on February 20th, 
1987).  
6) The Brady Plan came in 1989 with the explicit recognition of debt discounts. 
Nevertheless, the Government of Brazil (GOB) insisted that the 1/3 haircut in debt 
provided by the Brady Plan was not enough given the limitations of the country’s 
capacity of payment. Negotiations started at the end of 1990 and closed by March or 
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April 1991 with scanty results: just an agreement on repayment of interest due and 
unpaid during the period from mid-1989 through the beginning of 19912. 
7) The Brady Plan finally worked when international financial markets started to 
channel money again into Brazilian economy and interest rates came down 
significantly. 
8)  Conclusions: 
a) In cases of insolvency the stalemate comes from the difficult problem of 
ascertaining what could be reasonably affordable to the debtor country, to the 
financial community and to the Governments of creditor countries. In other 
words, how to distribute the burden of the crisis.  
b)  Given the obviously complicated stalemate, temporization may be the best or 
the only reasonable way to deal with crises of insolvency. Comprehensive 
solutions from the beginning do not seem to exist. 
c)  Money from IMF was never important at all. IMF has been important for the 
strategy of temporization. As long as GOB was talking to the IMF and signing 
stand-by arrangements or getting other kind of IMF facilities, even if it was 
necessary to ask waivers, to rewrite the letters of intention and so forth, all 
that provided the time required by the banks to enhance their capital basis, 
without the need to make early provisions. During that time, partial and interim 
agreements with both the financial community and the export credit agencies 
were possible with the support of IMF presence.  
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 The GOB interrupted interest payments in mid-1989 under great domestic financial disorder. But this was a 
friendly moratorium, if we may say so. 
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I. Antecedents 
9) Diagnosis of the crash: overinvestment under adverse international 
circumstances. Terms of trade losses resulting from the first oil shock of November 
1973. By that time Brazil was a heavy importer of oil. About 80% of domestic 
consumption was supplied from abroad.  And, as a side effect of the oil shock, the 
slowdown of economic activity in G7 countries, that were the main destination of 
Brazilian exports. 
10) We got the classical combination of elements that usually trigger a bubble of 
credit. A big pool of liquidity associated with investment opportunities that could make 
sense, but only in the beginning of the wave. 
11)  The Brazilian economy had performed wonderfully between 1968 and 1973 
when GDP growth reached the yearly average of 11,1%. That performance was a result 
of the institutional reforms and the stabilization plan put in place by President Castelo 
Branco Administration (1964 through 1967). Moreover during the 14 years from 1948 
through 1961 economic growth had been impressive too, showing a GDP yearly 
growth of 7,6%.  
12) If we take the 26 years as a whole – 1948 through 1973 – the average growth 
would be 7,6% per annum too. It is worth noting that we are counting the three years 
of President Castelo Branco stabilization plan and the two years – 1962 and 1963 – of 
strong agitation and political turmoil, coupled with generalized financial disorder, that 
paved the ground for military intervention in March 1964 and the authoritarian regime 
from then on, up to March 1985. 
13) Meanwhile, medium term loans had already started to flow to Brazil again, as 
well as to Latin American countries in general, after almost four decades of 
interruption, thanks to the consolidation of the Eurodollar Market. 
14) The first oil shock brought the accumulation of petrodollars into the 
international banking system. Neither oil exporting countries nor developed G7 
countries could absorb all that money. The former ones were too limited in economic 
scale; the latter were in a cycle of economic deceleration due to the oil shock itself. But 
the banks had to find a use for the idle balances in their vaults.  
15) The stage was ready for the escalation of the bubble. Latin America, together 
with other developing regions was the obvious target. Brazil for its size became one of 
the important borrowers. There banks could find nice interest rates for their loans, 
export credit agencies could finance their countries exports to supply machinery and 
equipment to those developing economies thirsty for capital to gear economic 
development. And multinational corporations could expand their business to hopeful 
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economic environments. Brazil in particular offered an especially friendly climate 
regarding the principles that should guide market economies. 
16)  By the end of 1973 gross external debt was only 15% of GDP and 43% of it was 
matched by international hard currency official reserves. Ten years later foreign 
currency reserves had been exhausted3, external debt reached 47% of GDP and 409% 
of exports4. 
 
 External Debt/GDP Domestic Debt/GDP (External + Domestic Debt)/GDP 
1981 26,7% 16,9% 43,6% 
1982 29,3% 21,3% 50,6% 
1983 47,2% 33,6% 80,8% 
1984 51,5% 40,5% 92,0% 
1985 49,0% 41,6% 90,6% 
1986 42,0% 27,7% 69,7% 
Sources: Central Bank of Brazil, IBGE, IPEA and FUNDAP. 
II. Distress and crash 
17)   Financial markets had become increasingly rarefied for Brazilian borrowers 
since 1979 following the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy. Interest rates 
skyrocketed. As of March 1980 Libor for Eurodollars reached 18,7% per annum and by 
December American prime rate was 20,2% per annum. 
18)    The Malvinas war in May 1982 coupled with the Mexican moratorium on 
August 13th fired the death blow in the Brazilian fourteen years old growth cum debt 
strategy. From then on financial markets closed for medium term debt to Brazil until 
1992/1993. Between 1989 and 1990 there appeared the first signs of Brazilian 
borrowers returning to international financial markets through short term lines of 
credit for trade and deposits in foreign subsidiaries and branches of Brazilian banks. 
19) The resistance to recognize economic realities as well as the limits of the 
possible were the preannouncement of the crisis:  phase of Distress5. The markets 
start to supect that something is not marching well but are not quite sure of how 
things will  behave, or about what to do.  
                                         
3
 There were arrears instead. That’s why the figure for reserves (cash concept) in December 1983 is negative (minus 
US$ 1.6 billion). 
4
 Exports of goods (fob). Exports of non-factor services were not relevant for Brazil Balance of Payments, and 
continue not to be,  
5
 The idea of a period of distress that comes just before the opening of the crisis comes from the classic book by 
Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics and Crashes. 
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20) As a matter of fact beginning in 1979 the hypothesis of a foreign exchange crisis 
should have been on the desk of all Brazilian economic policy makers. And it probably 
was, at least among the concerns ofProfessor Mário Henrique Simonsen who had 
moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of Planning with the new 
Administration in March 1979. Theoretically his mission would be to regain 
macroeconomic balance for the economy. He put in practice a gradual devaluation of 
the currency, interrupted new raising of loans in the international markets to avoid 
excessive pressure on the money supply, and started an austerity fiscal program.   
21) However the new incumbent President, General João Baptista Figueiredo, 
disliked the contraction of the economy that began to show up and substituted 
Professor Delfim Netto for Professor Simonsen, in August 1979, only five months after 
his inauguration. Professor Delfim Netto was a developmental economist who had 
been Minister of Finance for seven years, from 1967 through 1974. According to 
general expectations he pushed aggregate demand up. The economy grew 9,3% in 
1980, but Balance of Payments was by then clearly unsustainable. Perceiving the 
approaching collapse, he still made a desperate move to stop the economy. GDP 
contracted by 4,3% in 1981. But it was too late. 
22) I believe the decision to ask for IMF assistance and to move to a system of 
administrative refinancing of external debt was taken in the first half of 1982, by the 
time of the Malvinas war and before the Mexican moratorium on that unforgettable 
Friday, August 13th. But there were general elections scheduled for November in Brazil. 
The Government thought it convenient to wait until after the elections to open 
everything. We, at the Central Bank International Division, received instructions to 
maintain normality in the foreign exchange market up to the 15th of November, 
irrespective of the almost complete freezing of the markets. It was difficult, but we 
succeeded.   
23) For the Central Bank staff, at the Economic Department or at the International 
Operations Department, the collapse could have been everything buta surprise. Since 
1974 several studies and scenarios for the Balance of Payments and for the economy 
in general had been presented by the Economic Department of the Bank. All them 
showed that the strategy to react to the loss in the terms of trade and to the 
slowdown of G7 economies through pushing domestic absorption would lead, sooner 
or later, to a collapse in the Balance of Payments. Nevertheless, as it is the rule in 
Economics, it is very hard, if not impossible, to guess the precise timing.  
24) As a matter of course all the warnings had been disregarded. Loans continued 
to flow in. But not only economists at the Central Bank could see the danger. Other 
Government Offices also perceived the problems ahead. Economists at the Universities 
and Academic Centers of Economics raised the dangers in the horizon. Everything was 
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useless and we must also adress the issue of the responsibility of the lenders, and of 
the investors, besides that of the borrowers. 
25) They had the best economic advisers any firm can have, graduated from the 
most prestigious academic centers of the world, with top level salaries. What were all 
those people doing during all those years? Preparing information memoranda to state 
that the economy of Brazil was sound and strong enough to afford repayment of all 
the loans that were coming in? They did not perceive that the loans carried floating 
interest rates and the US economy was suffering growing inflationary pressures? And 
that if sometime in the future inflation had to be curbed and those interest rates 
would be raised? The consequence for a borrower under the floating interest rate 
regime is to face anticipation in the repayment of the loan. In other words the floating 
interest rate regime protects the lender against inflation through the anticipation of 
repayment. The indexation system protects him from inflation by keeping the real 
value of the principal. 
26) Government Authorities in the lenders countries must share the responsibilities 
too, because they have the duty to supervise their banks and financial institutions in 
general. 
27) These are the moral foundations for the discounts (haircuts) in debt 
restructuring programs, like the Brady Plan. 
III. Acute phase     
28) At the end of 1982 the crisis was apparent and came the time for the second 
round: the Acute or Critical Phase of the crisis.  
Main characteristics include some waves of panic which appeared while free riders 
tried to escape. The IMF on behalf of lenders and investors6 demanded unrealistic 
austerity policies. Successive Stand-By Arrangements had been agreed between the 
GOB and IMF and several Letters of Intention were signed by GOB. The so called 
conditionality package was systematically unfulfilled, basically concerning the Fiscal 
aspects. 
29) One of the characteristics of the acute phase was the insistent and pervasive 
idea that once and for all solutions could be engineered not very long after of the 
bubble blowing up. Sometimes the impression is that this could be accomplished even 
in the immediate aftermath of the crisis’ opening. However there was no definite 
solution from the beginning because we were facing an insolvency problem; not a 
liquidity one. 
                                         
6
 Their point is that they are acting to preserve the integrity of international financial markets. It is true, but it is 
relevant to bear in mind the unavoidable responsibility of the Government and Authorities of the creditor countries 
who did nothing to restrict the bubble from the point of view of lenders and investors in general. 
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30) For instance, we may cite two episodes of liquidity crises in recent Brazilian 
experience. One was at the beginning of 1999 when the fixed exchange rate model 
collapsed. Economic fundamentals were satisfactory. The problem was the artificial 
appreciation of the currency. Some fiscal adjustments and reforms were of course 
required, but nothing striking.  So an IMF agreement could be signed with easy, 
confidence was restored rapidly and the economy was flying again before the end of 
the first semester. 
31) The other was in 2002 after the political uncertainties regarding the high 
probability of President Lula’s election that year. Electoral stress came from the old 
radical platform of the Workers’ Party, which embodied, among other old fashioned 
items, moratorium and auditing of Government Debt and so forth. There was capital 
flight, severe exchange volatility with strong devaluation of the real. Once President 
Lula took office and those ideas were abandoned, the concerns went out and the 
economy returned to the tracks along 2003. 
32) One point deserves notice. At the same time Brazil was facing its electoral 
economic problems, between 2001 and 2002 Argentina confronted dramatic days with 
an unprecedented crisis in its severity and deepness following the collapse of their 
fixed exchange rate regime. Notwithstanding all the economic, social and cultural 
similarities between both countries, this time, differently from 1982, there was no 
contagion. Why? Because economic fundamentals in Brazil were solid. In other words, 
it doesn’t seem that contagion is just a herd phenomenon. No. What seems more 
reasonable is that, when a given economy is performing badly, all the others that share 
economic characteristics with the one that is failing need to be scrutinized in detail. If 
the fundamentals are good and economic policy reliable and consistent, contagion 
does not arise.   
33) But the real challenge of this critical phase was to avoid disruption and do not 
allow free riders to pull out short term lines of credit and interbank deposits to foreign 
branches and subsidiaries of Brazilian banks. An insufficiency of short term credit could 
severely destabilize the economy with unpredictable consequences. 
34) Brazil missed part of the conditionality package of the first Stand-By 
Arrangement signed in the beginning of 1983. Brazil started to accumulate arrears 
already in February of that year and by July a bridge loan from BIS could not be repaid 
because IMF had not disbursed the first tranche of the Stand-By. 
35) Short term credit continued to leak. In a major meeting with the Liaison 
Committee of the banks in April the Balance of Payments situation was presented 
clearly and frankly. Although the news was not at all good, this meeting calmed the 
financial community because it brought transparency to economic data and showed 
perspectives that seemed reliable and conceptually reasonable. 
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36) Once it became crystal clear that a comprehensive solution was impossible at 
that time, the financial community and the GOB took the wise decision to move to a 
temporization strategy. A steering committee was organized and negotiations started 
with the Paris Club envisaging rescheduling of the debt with export credit agencies. 
37) The steering committee started immediately to fight tooth and nail to keep the 
banks together in a big effort to maintain the short term lines to the Brazilian banking 
system, before this could be done through a firm commitment agreement. 
38) Why was a comprehensive solution impossible? Because Brazil was facing a 
double constraint: Balance of Payments and Fiscal challenges. If the exchange rate 
were devalued, dollars could be generated in the amounts required to satisfy 
payments under the terms and conditions acceptable to the creditors. But external 
debt servicing would become too expensive in domestic currency due to exchange rate 
devaluation; the Government could not generate primary surpluses large enough to 
purchase the needed dollars. The Balance of Payments conditions of the IMF were 
met, but not the fiscal targets.  
39) The other way around, if the exchange rate appreciated, Brazil would be short 
of dollars, but now the Government would be able to buy the hard currency in the 
amounts acceptable to the creditors. Unfortunately there would not be the required 
surpluses of dollars. 
40) So there was a stalemate. The banks argued that they could not grant softer 
conditions because of a lack of capital basis. The GOB sustained that there was no 
additional room to put further pressure on domestic investment and consumption. 
IV. Crisis becomes chronic  
41) To escape the stalemate and continue to gain time the GOB signed a new 
agreement with the banks for 1984 maturities and for new money. Brazilian currency 
was devaluated by 30% in February 1983; exports jumped and imports contracted. 
1984 trade account surplus came well above the projections, so the contractual new 
money became abundant. Central Bank was able to rebuild international reserves. 
Arrears were paid. Balance of Payments and foreign exchange market normalized. All 
that thanks to the administration of the external financing of the country. The 
intervention of governments (Brazilian and those of the creditor countries under the 
leadership of the United States and the UK) and of the financial community under the 
leadership of the steering committee did work. As a matter of fact they did a good job. 
42) From the point of view of the Balance of Payments one could believe the crisis 
was over. But the stalemate mentioned herein above (paragraphs 38, 39 and 40) was 
there. To lift the Balance of Payments constraint the GOB used inflationary finance. 
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Inflation that was already high (around 100% per annum) jumped to 200%. Forced 
savings and inflationary tax did the job of generating the required fiscal surplus to 
support the transfer of real resources abroad. 
43) Political reactions did not take long to show up. The new democratic 
Administration was plenty of old opponents of the authoritarian regime with 
noticeable nationalist and leftist biases. The mega trade account surpluses were 
closely associated with hyperinflation and economic stagnation. Besides that the new 
Administration seemed convinced that to accept the terms of the banks would be 
useless, since they believed that financial markets would not return to  bring fresh 
funds to Brazil in the foreseeable future. The facts showed they were completely 
wrong. Six years after the moratorium on external debt payments imposed on 
February 20th, 1987, the international financial community was once again voluntarily 
pumping resources into the Brazilian economy. 
44) As a matter of fact moratorium was an interruption of interest payments to 
banks. Principal repayments to them were being refinanced through successive interim 
agreements. Payments of principal and interest to the export agencies had stopped 
since 1985, although the GOB had resumed talks with the Paris Club envisaging some 
interim agreements or something of the like. Interest to short term debt was not 
affected. 
45) Three months later, in May 1987 Mr. Funaro substituted for Mr. Bresser-Pereira 
in the Ministry of Finance. The new Minister brought GOB back to the temporization 
strategy. Nevertheless moratorium was suspended only one year later, by July 1988 
with a new agreement with the creditors. 
V. The way out 
46) Just after the moratorium Citibank announced that they would build provisions 
of capital to allow for a discount to Brazilian debt. Citi was followed by other banks, so 
that between 1987 and 1988 the international banking system was finally getting 
ready for the unavoidable haircut and to offer more acceptable terms and conditions 
for the rescheduling exercises.   
47) This came with the Brady Plan in 1989. Nevertheless, the GOB insisted that the 
1/3 haircut in debt stipulated in the Brady Plan was not enough, given the country’s 
capacity of payment. Negotiations started at the end of 1990 and closed by March or 
April 1991 with scanty results: only an agreement on refinancing of interest due and 
unpaid during the period from mid-1989 through the beginning of 19917. 
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 The GOB had interrupted interest payments in mid-1989 under great financial disorder. But this was a friendly 
moratorium, if we may say so. 
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48) The Brady Plan finally worked when international financial markets started to 
pump money again into the Brazilian economy and interest rates dropped significantly.  
49) Nevertheless the final closing of the agreements under the rules of the Brady 
Plan, in 1994, did not receive IMF blessing, because fiscal fundamentals were not 
strong enough yet. But the financial community decided to go on irrespective of the 
IMF. Both sides were right. The IMF was right since Fiscal plicy actually needed 
additional reforms and adjustments. Part of this has eventually been done, but 
basically in President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s second term, after the liquidity 
crisis of January 1999. But part of this is still waiting to be realized.  
50) But the financial community was right as well. From a practical point of view a 
well-conceived monetary reform was in place, international financial markets were 
once again operative and there was a renewed confidence in the country. So, although 
in the first moment the domestic distributive conflicts would have to be financed from 
abroad8, in an atmosphere of economic growth and monetary stability it would 
probably be possible to enhance the Fiscal instance gradually.  
51) The facts showed that the Financial Community was clever to go ahead with the 
closing of the final agreement for Brazilian debt even without an IMF facility in place to 
guarantee the soundness of economic policy. 
52) Conclusion (1): in cases of insolvency, the stalemate comes from the difficult 
problem of ascertaining what could be reasonably affordable to the three actors in the 
drama: debtor country, financial community and the Governments of creditor 
countries. In other words, how to divide the burden of the crisis. 
47) Conclusion (2): Given the obviously complicated stalemate, temporization may 
be the best or the only reasonable way to deal with a crisis of insolvency. 
Comprehensive solutions from the beginning do not seem to exist. 
48)  Conclusion (3): Money from the IMF was never important at all. The IMF has 
been important for the strategy of temporization. As long as GOB was talking to the 
IMF and signing stand-by arrangements or other kinds of IMF facilities, even if it were 
necessary to ask waivers, to rewrite letters of intention and so forth, all of that 
provided the time required by the banks to enhance their capital basis, without the 
need to make early provisions. During that time, partial and interim agreements with 
both the financial community and the export credit agencies were possible with the 
support of IMF presence.  
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 The Fiscal performance of President Cardoso’s first term has been really poor: a very small primary surplus in 1995 
(0,26% of GDP), followed by two successive deficits in 1996 (0,1% of GDP) and in 1997 (0,96% of GDP), closing with a 
surplus of only 0,02% of GDP, in 1998. 
